56 THE ADVOCATE
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ENDNOTES
1. SBC 2004, c 41 REDMA.
2. REDMA does not apply to projects with fewer than
five strata lots. Definitions in s 1 of REDMA limit its
application to developers who own, lease or have a
right to acquire or dispose of five or more strata lots
in a stratified building.
3. British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly
(Hansard), 37th Parl, 5th Sess, Vol 25, No 7 (10
May 2004) at 10964.
4. The Real Estate Act, RSBC 1996, c 397 was repealed
and replaced when REDMA came into force in 2004.
Under ss 61–67 of the former Real Estate Act, a
developer needed to file a prospectus with the Superintendent
of Real Estate and provide it to prospective
purchasers before selling or leasing any subdivided
land or time-share interest. There were some exemptions
to the prospectus requirement under the former
Real Estate Act, including for strata corporations
incorporated before 1977 and housing co-operatives
incorporated before 1974. There was also a
provision that, instead of a prospectus in the prescribed
form, a disclosure statement accepted by the
Superintendent of Real Estate that met specific
requirements would suffice.
5. REDMA expanded the purchaser’s right to rescind.
Under s 72 of the predecessor legislation, the Real
Estate Act, the purchaser had a right to rescind only
during a “cooling-off” period of three to seven days
after entering the contract or receiving the disclosure
statement or prospectus. There was no right to
rescind following an amendment to the disclosure
statement or prospectus. Some purchasers tried to
argue that this right of rescission applied to purchasers
who received amended disclosure statements
or prospectuses, but the courts rejected those
claims. See, e.g., Pirog v Carnarvon (1990), 56
BCLR (2d) 11 at para 18 (SC); Beaton v Pyfrom
(1991), 56 BCLR (2d) 18 (SC).
6. Supra note 3 at 10964.
7. Maguire v Revelstoke Mountain Resort Ltd Partnership
, 2010 BCSC 1618 at para 44 Maguire.
8. In Pinto v Revelstoke Mountain Resort Limited Partnership
, 2011 BCCA 210 Pinto (BCCA), aff’g
2010 BCSC 422 Pinto (BCSC), the Court of Appeal
stated that “REDMA is consumer protection legislation.
One of its central objectives is to ensure that
material facts are provided to purchasers when
developments are being marketed to them: Dwane v.
Bastion Coast Homes, 2009 BCSC 726 at para. 69.
Consumer protection legislation is to be interpreted
generously in favour of the consumer: Seidel v.
TELUS Communications Inc., 2011 SCC 15 at para.
37” (para 17).
9. Section 21 of REDMA provides a right of rescission if
a purchaser is entitled to disclosure, including an
amended disclosure statement, and fails to receive it.
Section 23 provides that a developer who becomes
aware of a misrepresentation in a disclosure statement
must file an amended disclosure statement with
the superintendent within 30 days of becoming
aware of the misrepresentation and must deliver that
amended disclosure statement to the purchaser
within a reasonable time.
10. In Woo v Onni Ioco Road Five Development Limited
Partnership, 2014 BCCA 76 Woo, the Court of
Appeal stated that “this Court has previously recognized
that a principal objective of REDMA is the disclosure
of material information to purchasers. … This
Court has also recognized that the disclosure regime
is strict but balanced by flexibility in permitting
amendments whenever needed” (paras 46–47). The
Court of Appeal went on to say that the purchaser’s
right to rescind “creates a powerful incentive for
developers to correct misrepresentations by disclosing
material facts to preserve binding purchase
agreements” (para 70).
11. This requirement is set out in s 14 of REDMA, though
s 10 does allow pre-sale marketing in some cases
with the approval of the superintendent of real estate.
12. REDMA, ss 14(2)(b)–(c).
13. 2010 BCCA 300 Chameleon.
14. Ibid at para 31.
15. Ibid at para 16.
16. Maguire, supra note 7.
17. Ibid at para 80.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid at para 75.
20. Ibid at para 88, citing Chameleon, supra note 13 at
para 12. See also 299 Burrard Residential Limited
Partnership v Essalat, 2012 BCCA 271 at para 21
299 Burrard.
21. In 299 Burrard, supra note 20, the Court of Appeal
found that a construction delay of under four months,
representing less than a ten per cent delay in the 38-
month construction project, was material (para 23).
In Maguire, supra note 7, the B.C. Supreme Court
found that a delay of 10 to 16 months was material
(paras 89–90). In Pinto, supra note 8, the Court of
Appeal found that a delay of many months (the precise
number is unclear) was material (para 30).
22. In Woo, supra note 10, the Court of Appeal considered
an amended disclosure statement where the
amended disclosure said that building permits had
been issued on time; the court said that this disclosure
was not material (paras 65–66). Also, in Bosa
Properties (Edgemont) Inc v Ban, 2012 BCSC 94
Bosa, the B.C. Supreme Court found that a fourmonth
acceleration in the construction schedule was
not material (para 218).
23. Bosa, supra note 22 at para 218.
24. There are situations where an amendment will not be
sufficient and a developer must file an entirely new
disclosure statement, including if the misrepresentation
in the original disclosure concerns the developer’s
identity or if there has been an appointment of
a bankruptcy trustee or liquidator (REDMA, s 16(2)).
25. In Woo, supra note 10, the Court of Appeal approvingly
cited 299 Burrard, supra note 20 at para 25,