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18. Reliance-Based Estoppel, supra note 6 at 350
emphasis added. See, to the same effect, Bruce
MacDougall, Halsbury’s Laws of Canada – Estoppel
(2020 Reissue) at HSE-59; National Westminster
Finance NZ Limited v National Bank of NZ Limited,
1996 1 NZLR 548 at 550 (CA) National Westminster
Finance, cited with approval in Mainzeal Property
and Construction v Facility Finance Ltd, 2000
NZCA 187 at para 14 and Alpha Wealth Financial
Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Co Ltd,
2008 WASCA 119 at para 27. The same rule
applies in Hong Kong: Siegfried Adalbert Unruh v
Hans-Joerg Seeberger, 2004 HKEC 1071 at para
190 (CA); Cheer Sky Ltd v Chan Yuet Sheung,
2019 HKEC 674 at para 118(3).
19. 1999 CarswellBC 2012 (SC) Canacemal Investment
. See, to the same effect, Wood v Capital Bridging
Finance Ltd, 2015 EWCA Civ 451 at para 33.
20. Marion & Thiessen, supra note 8 at n 89 and accompanying
text.
21. (1937), 59 CLR 641 (Aust HC) Grundt.
22. Grundt has been cited with approval in many other
cases: see e.g. Manassen Holdings Pty Ltd v Commercial
& General Corp Pty Ltd, 2019 SASC 171
at para 259, citing with approval Outback Energy
Hunter Pty Ltd v New Standard Energy Pel 570 Pty
Ltd, 2018 SASC 8 at para 271, n 33, which cited
Grundt. Grundt was cited in what is generally
regarded as the leading UK case on estoppel by convention,
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd
v Texas Commercial International Bank Ltd (in liq),
1981 3 All ER 577 at 584 (CA), per Lord Denning.
His decision in turn has been cited in numerous UK
and Australian decisions and at least once in
Canada: Navroz Enterprises Ltd v Cinwez Properties
Ltd, 1991 CarswellOnt 2102 at para 29 (Gen Div).
Various academic writers agree that knowledge of
the falseness of the convention is irrelevant: T Brettel
Dawson, “Estoppel and Obligation: The Modern
Role of Estoppel by Convention” (1989) 9:1 Legal
Stud 16 at 33 (“the facts assumed by the parties
could be fabricated consciously by the parties for the
purposes of their interaction, provided that there was
no external impediment to this”); Kristina Bunting,
“Estoppel by Convention and Pre-Contractual
Understandings: The Position and Practical Consequences”
(2011) 42:3 Victoria U Wellington L Rev
511 at 514 (“estoppel by convention may be distinguished
from other forms of estoppel due to the
requirement of ‘mutuality’. It is essential that both
parties adopt the assumption as a basis for their
transaction. However, a belief in the truth of the
assumed version of facts is not necessary. The parties
may know that the assumption which is the basis of
their transaction is untrue” footnotes omitted); Elizabeth
Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), ch 3, at 30 (“the
idea of an agreed state of affairs, or convention,
makes it possible for someone to be estopped from
going back on the impression that he has given, even
where it is not possible to show that the other party
believed that the impression given, or statement
made, was true. It may be clear that he knew it was
false”); Raymond Mulholland, “Estoppel by Convention”,
New Zealand Law Journal (November 2002)
395, citing Grundt (this article also traces the evolution
of estoppel by convention from a common law
doctrine to an equitable doctrine).
23. MacDougall, supra note 1 at 130, §3.42–3.43.
24. 1998 CarswellOnt 1968 (Gen Div) Capro Investments
emphasis added.
25. See e.g. Wagman v Obrigewitsch, 2010 SKQB 84
at para 66, aff’d on this point but varied on other
points 2011 SKCA 68 at para 6.
26. Concord Pacific Acquisitions Inc v Oei, 2019 BCSC
1190 at para 404 (appeal pending).
27. Unreported, 1987 Lexis Citation 1183 (Ch). This
sentence has been cited with approval in numerous
decisions, including Norwegian American Cruises
A/S (formerly Norwegian American Lines A/S) v
Paul Munday Ltd, 1988 2 Lloyd’s Rep 343 at 352
(CA).
28. Even regarding future dealings this sentence is
wrong. As noted above, the parties may well agree
to proceed on the basis of, or to “have accepted”
(Ryan v Moore, supra note 4 at para 61), an untrue
convention.
29. 2015 EWCA Civ 1023 at para 73 (CA).
30. 2007 NSWCA 65 at paras 195, 232.
31. 1937 4 All ER 396 at 404 (HL) Greer.
32. 2017 UKPC 27 at para 29. On the other hand, the
criticism is not universal: Rory Derham, “Estoppel by
Convention—Parts I and II” (1997) 71 ALJ 860 and
976 cites Grundt and later cites Greer without suggesting
that they contradict each other.
33. 2014 EWHC 4191 at para 94 (Ch). See the same
question raised but not answered in Asgain, supra
note 17 at paras 46–48. In Helmich & Taylor v Thorp
& Strathdee, 1997 3 NZLR 86 at 92 (GC), Fisher J
referred to National Westminster Finance, supra
note 18 at 550 (“although both know that their
assumption is, in truth, erroneous they will be held to
it if the remaining indicia of convention estoppel are
present. Knowledge of the falsity in fact of the
assumption does not prevent the estoppel, if for their
purposes the parties have nevertheless accepted the
assumption as being true”) and at 93 cited Greer but
did not attempt to reconcile the cases.
34. Supra note 8 at para 34. This would seem to be a
specific example of the more general rule stated in
Slocom Trading Ltd v Tatik Inc, 2012 EWHC 3464
(Ch), where Roth J referred to Greer but held that, on
the facts, it should not be applied because “the
exception to estoppel by deed, as Greer v Kettle (and
indeed, Mainland v Upjohn) make clear, is an equitable
exception. There is nothing inequitable in Tatik
being bound by its statement of indebtedness in those
circumstances” (para 287). See also Featherstone
Park Developments Ltd (in rec and liq) v Bradley,
2011 NZHC 530 at paras 62–63.
35. Reliance-Based Estoppel, supra note 6 at 354, s 8.
70.